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Optimization of Code Rates in SISOME
Wiretap Channels
Shihao Yan, Nan Yang, Giovanni Geraci, Robert Malaney, and Jinhong Yuan
Abstract—We propose a new framework for determining the
wiretap code rates of single-input single-output multi-antenna
eavesdropper (SISOME) wiretap channels when the capacity of
the eavesdropper’s channel is not available at the transmitter.
In our framework we introduce the effective secrecy throughput
(EST) as a new performance metric that explicitly captures the
two key features of wiretap channels, namely, reliability and
secrecy. Notably, the EST measures the average rate of the
confidential information transmitted from the transmitter to the
intended receiver without being eavesdropped on. We provide
easy-to-implement methods to determine the wiretap code rates
for two transmission schemes: 1) adaptive transmission scheme
in which the capacity of the main channel is available at the
transmitter and 2) fixed-rate transmission scheme in which the
capacity of the main channel is not available at the transmitter.
Such determinations are further extended into an absolute-
passive eavesdropping scenario where even the average signal-
to-noise ratio of the eavesdropper’s channel is not available at
the transmitter. Notably, our solutions for the wiretap code rates
do not require us to set reliability or secrecy constraints for the
transmission within wiretap channels.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, wiretap code, wiretap
channels, effective secrecy throughput, passive eavesdropping.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security for wireless communications is of
growing importance since it can guarantee the information
secrecy regardless of an eavesdropper’s computational capa-
bility and it eliminates the key distribution and management
required by traditional cryptographic techniques [1–5]. In the
pioneering studies [6–8], a wiretap channel was proposed as
the fundamental model to characterize physical layer security.
In the wiretap channel, an eavesdropper (Eve) attempts to
intercept the communication between a transmitter (Alice)
and an intended receiver (Bob). The prerequisite to achieve
physical layer security is that the capacity of the channel
between Alice and Bob (henceforth referred to as the main
channel) is larger than the capacity of the channel between
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Alice and Eve (henceforth referred to as the eavesdropper’s
channel).
From the perspective of wiretap code design, the knowledge
of the capacities of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel is required at Alice in order to guarantee perfect
secrecy [10]. In fact, perfect secrecy has two requirements:
(i) the error probability at Bob decreases with increasing
code length, and (ii) the fraction of information leakage
to Eve decreases with increasing code length. These two
requirements are denoted as the reliability constraint and the
secrecy constraint, respectively [10–12]. A wiretap code can
be designed by choosing two code rates, namely, the codeword
rate, RB , and the rate of transmitted confidential information
(or equivalently, the target secrecy rate), Rs [10, 11]. The
redundancy rate, RE = RB − Rs, is used to confuse Eve.
In order to guarantee the reliability constraint of wiretap
channels, the rate of transmitted codewords has to be chosen as
RB ≤ CB , where CB is the capacity of the main channel. In
order to guarantee the secrecy constraint of wiretap channels,
the redundancy rate has to be chosen as RE > CE , where CE
is the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel. If the values of
both CB and CE are available at Alice, the maximum target
secrecy rate is achievable, which is referred to as the secrecy
capacity of a wiretap channel and is given by Cs = CB −CE
[13–16]. However, the assumption that CE is available at
Alice is too strong since in practice Eve may not feed back
her channel state information (CSI) to Alice. In addition, in
practice Alice may not know CB since Bob may not feed back
CB to Alice due to the limited feedback overhead supported
by the main channel1.
We note that it is impossible for Alice to guarantee RE >
CE and fulfill the secrecy constraint in the case where only
the statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel is
available at Alice. In this case, the performance of wiretap
channels has been characterized in terms of the ergodic secrecy
capacity [13, 17], and in terms of the existing secrecy outage
probability, i.e., Pr(Cs < Rs) [18–22]. It is important to point
out that the ergodic secrecy capacity is an average performance
metric, and thus cannot be utilized to set RB or RE . The
use of the existing secrecy outage probability in determining
RB or RE has the drawback that it does not separate the
quality of service (reliability requirements) from the secrecy
requirements.
In this paper, we propose a new framework to determine
the wiretap code rates when the capacity of the eavesdropper’s
1The number of bits required to feed back CB from Bob to Alice depends
on the quantization accuracy of CB .
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channel is not available at Alice. Our framework is based on
a new metric, referred to as the effective secrecy throughput
(EST), which explicitly captures both the reliability constraint
and the secrecy constraint of wiretap channels. The EST
measures the average rate of the confidential information
transmitted from Alice to Bob without being eavesdropped on.
As we will discuss in more details later, the key attribute of
our new metric is that it encapsulates the main features of the
wiretap channel, yet can be applied to a variety of transmission
schemes.
In our proposed framework we provide easy-to-implement
methods to determine the wiretap code rates that achieve
the locally maximum EST for two system models. (i) The
first model is a high complexity system where Bob feeds
back the capacity of the main channel to Alice. We refer
to the transmission scheme under this system model as the
adaptive transmission scheme since Bob adaptively adjusts his
wiretap code rates according to CB . (ii) The second model
is a low complexity system where Bob does not feed back
the capacity of the main channel to Alice. We refer to the
transmission scheme under this system model as the fixed-
rate transmission scheme since Bob has to fix his wiretap
code rates when CB and CE are unavailable. In the above
two models, we assume that the average signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) of the eavesdropper’s channel is available at Alice.
In order to relax this assumption, we consider an absolute-
passive eavesdropping scenario where the average SNR of the
eavesdropper’s channel is unavailable at Alice. For this latter
scenario, we derive closed-form expressions for the average
EST of the adaptive and the fixed-rate transmission schemes,
based on which the wiretap code rates of these two schemes
can be determined.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
details the system model and the proposed new framework
for determining the wiretap code rates. In Section III, the
determination of the redundancy rate RE for the adaptive
transmission scheme is presented. Section IV presents the
determination of (RB, RE) for the fixed-rate transmission
scheme. In Section V, we extend the determination of the
wiretap code rates into an absolute-passive eavesdropping
scenario based on a proposed annulus threat model. Numerical
results are provided in Section III, Section IV, and Section
V in order to verify our analysis and provide useful insights
into our solutions. Finally, Section VI draws some concluding
remarks.
Notation: Scalar variables are denoted by italic symbols.
Vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-case and upper-
case boldface symbols, respectively. Given a complex vector
x, ‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. The m×m identity matrix
is referred to as Im and E[·] denotes expectation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND NEW FRAMEWORK
In this section, we detail our system model and the new
framework for determining wiretap code rates (RB and RE )
using the proposed EST.
A. System Model
The wiretap channel of interest is where the transmitter (Al-
ice) and the intended receiver (Bob) are equipped with a single
antenna each, and the eavesdropper (Eve) is equipped with NE
antennas. This wiretap channel is referred to as the single-input
single-output multi-antenna eavesdropper (SISOME) wiretap
channel. We note that the deployment of multiple antennas
at the eavesdropper is more conservative (from a security
viewpoint) than the deployment of a single antenna at the
eavesdropper. This is due to the fact that the transmitter cannot
fully control the number of antennas at Eve.
We assume that the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel are subject to independent quasi-static Rayleigh fading
with equal block length. We also assume that Bob possesses
the full knowledge of the instantaneous CSI of the main
channel, but Alice only knows the average SNR of the main
channel. We further assume that Eve knows the instantaneous
CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel. As such, Eve applies
maximum ratio combining (MRC) [23–25] to combine the
received signals in order to exploit the NE-antenna diversity
and maximize the probability of successful eavesdropping.
This is due to the fact that when Alice transmits a single
data stream, the maximum output SNR of the eavesdropper’s
channel is achieved at Eve if Eve adopts MRC. In our system
model, Alice and Bob are equipped with a single antenna each
and therefore Alice transmits a single data stream to Bob.
The received signal at Bob is given by
yB = hx+ nB, (1)
where h is the complex coefficient of the main channel
with Rayleigh fading, x is the transmit signal, and nB is
the Gaussian noise of the main channel with zero mean
and variance σ2B . The transmit power constraint is given by
E[|x|2] = PA, where PA is the total transmit power. Based on
(1), the instantaneous SNR at Bob is obtained as
γB =
|h|2PA
σ2B
, (2)
which indicates that γB follows an exponential distribution
with 1/γB as the rate parameter, where γB = E[γB ].
The NE × 1 received signal vector at Eve is given by
yE = gx+ nE , (3)
where g is the NE × 1 eavesdropper’s channel vector with
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading
entries, and nE is circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
noise vector of the eavesdropper’s channel with zero mean
and covariance matrix INEσ2E . Applying MRC to exploit the
NE-antenna diversity at Eve, the instantaneous SNR at Eve is
obtained as
γE =
‖g‖2PA
σ2E
, (4)
which indicates that γE follows a Gamma distribution with
NE and γE = E[γE ]/NE as the shape and scale parameters,
respectively.
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B. New Framework for Determining Wiretap Code Rates
In wiretap channels, Alice intends to sent the confidential
information to Bob with a high transmission rate while guar-
anteeing both the reliability constraint and secrecy constraint.
However, if the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel is not
available at Alice, the secrecy constraint cannot be guaranteed
and a secrecy outage may occur. We define the secrecy outage
probability as
Os(RE) = Pr(RE < CE). (5)
We note that Os(RE) is different from the existing secrecy
outage probability, Pr(Cs < Rs), since the latter includes
not only the secrecy outage probability but also the reliability
outage probability. As such, it is not exactly precise to name
Pr(Cs < Rs) as the secrecy outage probability.
Likewise, if the capacity of the main channel is not available
at Alice, the reliability constraint cannot be guaranteed and
thus a reliability outage may occur. We define the reliability
outage probability as
Or(RB) = Pr(RB > CB). (6)
Based on (6), we can see that the reliability constraint can be
guaranteed if CB is available at Alice.
Incorporating both the secrecy outage probability and relia-
bility outage probability, we present the EST in the following
definition.
Definition 1: The EST (bit/channel) of a wiretap channel
is defined as
Ψ(RB , RE)=(RB−RE) [1−Or(RB)] [1−Os(RE)] . (7)
In order to explicitly explain the physical meaning of the
EST of a wiretap channel, we present a schematic of secure
transmissions within multiple fading blocks in Fig. 1. In
(7), (RB −RE) quantifies the rate of transmitted confidential
information Rs (represented by a blue block at Alice in Fig. 1),
while [1−Or (RB)] [1−Os (RE)] quantifies the probability
that the information is securely transmitted from Alice to
Bob. In Fig. 1, the reliability outage probability corresponds
to the probability that Bob receives a yellow block, and the
secrecy outage probability corresponds to the probability that
Bob receives a red block. Therefore, the EST quantifies the
average secrecy rate at which the messages are transmitted
from Alice to Bob without being leaked to Eve (i.e., the EST
quantifies the average number of the blue blocks achieved at
Bob over a large number of fading realizations). Accordingly,
the EST tells us the average rate of messages that can be
securely transmitted. In the following sections, we determine
values of the wiretap code rates (i.e., RB , RE) for the adaptive
and fixed-rate transmission schemes.
Knowing the average rate of confidential messages is of
practical significance for the passive eavesdropping scenario,
since it indicates to us how much secure data can be transmit-
ted on average over a given period of time in a wiretap channel.
We note that we cannot identify which message is secure and
which is not. We would clarify that this is not due to the use of
the EST, but is due to the adopted eavesdropping scenario. In
our adopted scenario the instantaneous channel knowledge of
Fig. 1. A schematic to illustrate the operational significance of the effective
secrecy throughput (EST) over a large number of fading blocks.
Eve is not available at Alice, which leads to the fact that it is
impossible to guarantee perfect secure transmission between
Alice and Bob (i.e., secrecy outage possibly occurs). Due to
this, previous studies adopted the secrecy outage probability
(e.g., [19, 21, 26]) and/or the throughput (e.g., [27–29]) as
the performance metrics. We note that the average rate of
confidential messages cannot be readily evaluated by either
the secrecy outage probability or the throughput. As such, the
EST is more informative and is of more practical operational
significance to Bob in some circumstances. For example, Bob
may maximize the EST without any bound on the secrecy
outage probability or the throughput.
We note here the work of [27] focussed on an on-off
transmission scheme for the wiretap channel and introduced
a new metric that is motivated by a desire to disentangle
reliability and secrecy features. The approach used in [27] is
based on a new secrecy outage probability defined through
a conditional probability. This is quite different from the
approach adopted here where we directly maximize a key
throughput rate of the wiretap channel - the EST. Importantly,
our technique does not target any transmission scheme in
particular and therefore is directly applicable to a wide range
of schemes and system models.
III. DETERMINATION OF REDUNDANCY RATE FOR
ADAPTIVE TRANSMISSION SCHEME
In this section, we first derive a closed-form expression
for the EST of the adaptive transmission scheme, based on
which we provide an easy-to-implement method to determine
the redundancy rate RE that achieves a locally maximum
EST for this scheme. We note that applying the adaptive
transmission scheme requires the capacity of the main channel
to be available at Alice. As such, the complexity of the system
where the adaptive transmission scheme can be applied is high
since Bob has to feed back CB to Alice.
A. Adaptive Transmission Scheme
In the adaptive transmission scheme, CB is available at
Alice and RB is chosen as RB = CB . As such, to design
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a wiretap code for the adaptive transmission scheme we
only need to determine the value of RE . In the adaptive
transmission scheme, RE is adjusted within the constraint
0 < RE < CB according to each γB . Since RB is chosen as
RB = CB , the reliability constraint can always be guaranteed
in the adaptive transmission scheme (reliability outage proba-
bility is zero). We note that a secrecy outage may occur since
CE is not available at Alice. In the following, we first present
the secrecy outage probability of the adaptive transmission
scheme.
As per the definition of Os(RE), the secrecy outage prob-
ability of the adaptive transmission scheme is
Os,a(RE) = Pr(RE < CE) = Pr
(
γE > 2
RE − 1
)
= 1− FγE
(
2RE − 1
)
,
(8)
where FγE (γE) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf)
of γE , which is
FγE (γE) = 1− e
−
γE
γE
NE−1∑
j=0
1
j!
(
γE
γE
)j
. (9)
As such, the EST of the adaptive transmission scheme is given
in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The EST of the adaptive transmission scheme is
Ψa(RE)=(CB−RE)
1−e−2RE−1γE NE−1∑
j=0
1
j!
(
2RE−1
γE
)j .
(10)
Proof: Since the reliability outage probability of the adap-
tive transmission scheme is zero and RB is set as RB = CB ,
based on (7) the EST of the adaptive transmission scheme is
given by
Ψa(RE) = (CB−RE) [1−Os,a(RE)]
= (CB−RE)FγE
(
2RE−1
)
.
(11)
Substituting (9) into (11), we obtain the result in (10).
Based on the closed-form expression for Ψa(RE) given in
(11), the value of RE that locally maximizes the EST of the
adaptive transmission scheme can be numerically determined.
To facilitate this numerical determination, we first derive the
first-order derivative of (10) with respect to RE as
∂Ψa(RE)
∂RE
=−1+e
−2
RE−1
γE
NE−1∑
j=0
1
j!
(
2RE−1
γE
)j
+(CB−RE)
(
2RE ln 2
γE
)
e
− 2
RE−1
γE
(NE−1)!
(
2RE−1
γE
)NE−1
.
(12)
By setting ∂Ψa(RE)/∂RE = 0 and performing some alge-
braic manipulations, the value of RE that achieves a stationary
point of Ψa(RE)) can be obtained by solving the fixed-point
equation given by
R†E = CB −
γE(NE − 1)!
2R
†
E ln 2
(
γE
2R
†
E − 1
)NE−1
×
e 2R†E−1γE −NE−1∑
j=0
1
j!
(
2R
†
E−1
γE
)j . (13)
The second-order derivative of (10) with respect to RE is
derived as
∂2Ψa(RE)
∂R2E
=
(
2RE ln 2
γE
)
e
− 2
RE−1
γE
(NE−1)!
(
2RE−1
γE
)NE−1
×
[
(CB−RE)
(
1−
2RE
γE
)
ln 2−2
+
(
ln 2
2RE − 1
+ ln 2
)
(CB−RE)(NE−1)
]
. (14)
An analysis of identifying stationary points via (12) and
(14) is not tractable. Instead, we investigate the nature of
the stationary points via detailed simulations and numerical
calculations over all the anticipated operating conditions. Al-
though such simulations do not formally prove the globally
optimal solution, we find that in the value range of RE (i.e.,
0 < RE < CB) the stationary points obtained through (13)
are identified as local maxima in all simulations. An example
of our simulations is shown in Fig. 2 (see numerical results
section for details). As we see, for the chosen simulation
parameters locally maximum operating points are easily iden-
tified.
Substituting R†E into (10), we obtain a stationary value
of Ψa(RE), which is denoted by Ψ∗a. We now conduct the
asymptotic analysis of R†E and provide some valuable insights
into R†E for NE = 1 in the following remarks.
Remark 1: As γE → 0, we obtain R
†
E → 0.
Proof: When NE = 1, (10) reduces to
Ψa(RE)=(CB−RE)
[
1−e
−2
RE−1
γE
]
. (15)
It is found from (13) that Ψa(RE) converges to (CB−RE) as
γE → 0. Therefore, due to the constraint 0 < RE < CB , we
have R†E → 0.
It is indicated from Remark 1 that Eve can be ignored if she
is far from Alice. This is mainly due to the fact that the secrecy
outage probability approaches zero as Eve moves further away
from Alice (i.e., as the average SNR of the eavesdropper’s
channel approaches zero).
Remark 2: As γE → ∞, R
†
E can be obtained by solving
the fixed-point equation given by
R†E = CB −
1− 2−R
†
E
ln 2
. (16)
Proof: Applying lim
x→0
e−x ≈ 1− x into (15), we obtain
lim
γE→∞
(CB−RE)
[
1−e
−2
RE−1
γE
]
≈ (CB−RE)
2RE−1
γE
.
(17)
By setting the first-order derivative of (17) with respect to RE
as zero, we obtain the fixed-point equation in (16) after some
algebraic manipulations.
From Remark 2, we see that R†E does not approach CB
but the effective secrecy throughput Ψa(RE) approaches zero
as γE → ∞. This is due to the fact that the secrecy outage
probability of the adaptive transmission scheme approaches
one as γE → ∞ (i.e., the secure transmission probability
approaches zero as γE → ∞). Notably, R†E approaches a
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Fig. 2. EST of the adaptive transmission scheme, Ψa(RE), versus RE for
NE = 3, γB = 20 dB, and different values of γE .
constant value that is a function of CB . This is due to the fact
that the value of RE that enables the first-order derivative of
(17) to be zero does not depend on γE .
B. Numerical Results
In this subsection, we present numerical results to examine
the impact of the number of antennas at Eve and the SNRs
of the main channel and eavesdropper’s channel, on the
redundancy rate R†E .
In Fig. 2, we plot the EST of the adaptive transmission
scheme, Ψa(RE), versus RE for different values of γE . The
theoretic curve is obtained from (10). In this figure, we first
observe that the Monte Carlo simulations precisely match the
theoretic curves, which validates our analysis in Lemma 1.
We also observe that Ψa(RE) increases as γE decreases,
which demonstrates that the worse the eavesdropper’s channel
is the larger EST the adaptive transmission scheme achieves.
Moreover, we observe that a unique value of RE exists which
maximizes Ψa(RE) for a given γB . Focusing on the peaks of
the three curves, we also observe that R†E decreases as γE
decreases, which demonstrates that the further Eve is from
Alice the smaller redundancy rate we set in order to maximize
the EST.
In Fig. 3, we plot the redundancy rate for the adaptive
transmission scheme, R†E , versus γB for different values of
NE and γE . The curves represent the theoretic results for R
†
E
obtained from (13), and the symbols represent the simulated
results for R†E obtained from Monte Carlo simulations. The
accuracy of (13) is demonstrated in this figure. As expected,
we first observe that R†E increases as γE increases. We
also observe that R†E first increases as γB increases and
then approaches a constant as γB approaches large values.
Furthermore, we observe that R†E increases as NE increases.
This can be explained by the fact that a higher NE leads to a
better quality of the eavesdropper’s channel.
5 10 15 20 25 30
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3.5
4.5
5.5
6.5
γB (dB)
R
† E
 
 
γE = 0 (dB)
γE = 10 (dB)
NE = 1
NE = 2
NE = 4
Fig. 3. Redundancy rate of the adaptive transmission scheme, R†
E
, versus
γB for different values of NE and γE .
IV. DETERMINATION OF WIRETAP CODE RATES FOR
FIXED-RATE TRANSMISSION SCHEME
In this section, we first derive a closed-form expression
for the EST of the fixed-rate transmission scheme, based on
which we provide an easy-to-implement method to determine
the codeword rate RB and redundancy rate RE that jointly
achieve a locally maximum EST for this scheme. We note
that the fixed-rate transmission scheme does not require the
capacity of the main channel be available at Alice. As such,
this scheme is a lower complexity system in which there is no
feedback from Bob to Alice.
A. Fixed-Rate Transmission Scheme
In the fixed-rate transmission scheme, both CB and CE
are unavailable at Alice, so we have to jointly determine RB
and RE for given γB and γE . Therefore, both the reliability
constraint and secrecy constraint cannot be guaranteed in this
scheme. In the following, we first present the reliability outage
probability and secrecy outage probability.
As per the definition of Or(RB), the reliability outage
probability of the fixed-rate transmission scheme is
Or,f (RB) = Pr(RB > CB) = FγB
(
2RB − 1
)
, (18)
where FγB (γB) is the cdf of γB , which is
FγB (γB) = 1− e
−
γB
γB . (19)
According to the definition of Os(RE), the secrecy outage
probability of the fixed-rate transmission scheme is
Os,f (RE) = Pr(RE < CE) = 1− FγE
(
2RE − 1
)
. (20)
The EST of the fixed-rate transmission scheme is presented in
the following lemma.
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Lemma 2: The EST of the fixed-rate transmission scheme
is
Ψf (RB, RE) = (RB −RE) e
− 2
RB−1
γB
×
1−e−2RE−1γE NE−1∑
j=0
1
j!
(
2RE−1
γE
)j .
(21)
Proof: As per the definition of Ψ(RB, RE), the EST of
the fixed-rate transmission scheme can be written as
Ψf (RB, RE)=(RB−RE) [1−Or,f(RB)] [1−Os,f(RE)]
=(RB−RE)
[
1−FγB
(
2RB−1
)]
FγE
(
2RE−1
)
.
(22)
Substituting (19) and (9) into (22), we obtain the result in (21)
after some algebraic manipulations.
Using (22), the values of (RB, RE) that achieve a locally
maximum EST can be obtained through
(RB, RE)
∗ = argmax
0<RB ,0<RE<RB
Ψf (RB, RE). (23)
To make progress let us define two functions, F(·) and G(·),
as
F(NE , RE , γE) =
NE−1∑
j=0
1
j!
(
2RE − 1
γE
)j
(24)
and
G(NE , RE , γE) =
2RE ln 2
γE(NE − 1)!
(
2RE − 1
γE
)NE−1
. (25)
We note that 1− F(NE , RE , γE)e
− 2
RE−1
γE and e−
2
RB−1
γB are
both positive for 0 < RE < RB and finite NE . Setting the
first-order partial derivative of (21) with respect to RB to zero,
we obtain
1− (RB −RE)
2RB ln 2
γB
= 0,
which results in
RE = RB −
γB
2RB ln 2
. (26)
Similarly, by setting the first-order partial derivative of (21)
with respect to RE to zero, we obtain
F(NE , RE , γE)− (RB −RE)G(NE , RE , γE) = e
2
RE−1
γE ,
which results in
RB = RE +
e
2
RE−1
γE −F(NE , RE , γE)
G(NE , RE , γE)
. (27)
Substituting (26) into (27) and performing some algebraic
manipulations, the value of RB that achieves a stationary point
of Ψf (RB , RE) can be obtained through solving the fixed-
point equation given by
R∗B = R
∗
E +
e
2
R∗
E−1
γE −F(NE , R
∗
E , γE)
G(NE , R∗E , γE)
, (28)
where
R∗E = R
∗
B −
γB
2R
∗
B ln 2
, (29)
and the value of RE that jointly achieves the stationary point
of Ψf (RB, RE) can be obtained by substituting R∗B into (29).
The Hessian matrix of (21), which is symmetric based on
Young’s theorem [30], is given by
H=
 ∂2Ψf (RB ,RE)∂R2B ∂2Ψf (RB ,RE)∂RB∂RE
∂2Ψf (RB ,RE)
∂RE∂RB
∂2Ψf (RB ,RE)
∂R2E
=[ A B
B C
]
, (30)
where
A = −
2RB ln 2
γB
e
− 2
RB−1
γB × D
×
[
2 + ln 2(RB−RE)
(
1−
2RB
γB
)]
, (31)
B =
2RB ln 2
γB
e
− 2
RB−1
γB ×D
+ e
− 2
RB−1
γB
[
1− (RB −RE)
2RB ln 2
γB
]
× E , (32)
C = −2e
− 2
RB−1
γB × E + (RB−RE)e
− 2
RB−1
γB × E
×
[
ln 2 + (NE − 1)
2RE ln 2
2RE − 1
−
2RE ln 2
γE
]
, (33)
with
D = 1−e
−2
RE−1
γE
NE−1∑
j=0
1
j!
(
2RE−1
γE
)j
, (34)
E =
2RE ln 2
γE(NE − 1)!
(
2RE − 1
γE
)NE−1
e
− 2
RE−1
γE . (35)
If A < 0 and A×C−B2 > 0 when RB = R∗B and RE = R∗E ,
we can conclude that R∗B and R∗E lead to a locally maximum
Ψf(RB , RE). However, a rigorous analysis of identifying
stationary points via (28) and (30) is not tractable. Instead,
we once again investigate the nature of the stationary points
via detailed simulations and numerical calculations over all
the anticipated operating conditions and over the rate range
0 < RE < RB < 100. We find that such simulations and
numerical calculations always identify the locally maximum
solutions, although they do not formally identify the globally
optimal solution. One exemplary numerical result is presented
in Fig. 4, where there is a unique pair of RB and RE achieving
the locally maximum Ψf (RB, RE). It is highlighted that (28)
is of great significance since it is difficult to conduct numerical
search to find R∗B and R∗E under the constraint on (RB , RE)
given by 0 < RE < RB < +∞. Instead, we can solve
(28) iteratively by setting the initial value of R∗E to zero.
Substituting R∗B and R∗E into (21), we obtain the stationary
value of Ψf (RB, RE), which is denoted by Ψ∗f .
We next conduct the asymptotic analysis for NE = 1 and
offer some valuable insights into R∗B and R∗E in the following
remarks.
Remark 3: As γE → 0, R∗B for a given γB can be obtained
through solving the fixed-point equation given by
R∗B =
γB
2R
∗
B ln 2
, (36)
and the corresponding R∗E approaches zero.
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Proof: As γE → 0, we obtain Os,f (RE) → 0. Accord-
ingly, (21) with NE = 1 reduces to
Ψf (RB, RE) = (RB −RE) e
− 2
RB−1
γB . (37)
Setting the first-order derivative of (37) with respect to RB
as zero, we obtain the result in (36) after some algebraic
manipulations.
From Remark 3, we see that Eve can be ignored if she
is far from Alice since R∗E → 0 as γE → 0. This is
due to the fact that the secrecy outage probability of the
fixed-rate transmission scheme, Os,f (RE), approaches zero
as γE → 0. We also note that R∗B is a function of γB only,
which can be explained by the fact that R∗B is determined
through maximizing RB [1−Or,f(RB)]. We further note that
Ψ∗f approaches a constant value which is determined by γB
as γE → 0, due to that Os,f (RE)→ 0 as γE → 0.
Remark 4: As γE → ∞, R∗B for a given γB can be
obtained through solving the fixed-point equation given by
R∗B = R
∗
E +
2R
∗
E − 1
2R
∗
E ln 2
, (38)
where
R∗E = R
∗
B −
γB
2R
∗
B ln 2
, (39)
and R∗E can be obtained by substituting R∗B into (39).
Proof: When NE = 1, (21) reduces to
Ψf (RB, RE) = (RB−RE) e
− 2
RB−1
γB
(
1−e
−2
RE−1
γE
)
. (40)
Since RE is still finite as γE →∞, we apply lim
x→0
e−x ≈ 1−x
into (40) and obtain
lim
γE→∞
Ψf (RB, RE)≈(RB −RE) e
− 2
RB−1
γB
2RE − 1
γE
. (41)
We note 2
RE−1
γE
> 0 due to RE > 0 as γE →∞. Setting the
first-order derivative of (41) with respect to RB as zero, we
obtain
(RB −RE)
2RB ln 2
γB
= 1. (42)
Likewise, setting the first-order derivative of (41) with respect
to RE as zero, we obtain
−
2RE − 1
γE
+ (RB −RE)
2RE ln 2
γE
= 0, (43)
which results in (due to γE 6= 0)
1− 2RE + (RB −RE) 2
RE ln 2 = 0. (44)
Substituting (42) into (44), we obtain the fixed-point equation
in (38) after some algebraic manipulations.
It is highlighted from Remark 4 that (38) and (39) are
independent of γE , which indicates that R∗B and R∗E are
not functions of γE as γE → ∞. This is due to the fact
that the secrecy outage probability Os,f (RE) approaches 1 as
γE →∞.
2
4
6
8 0
2
4
6
8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
 
RE
RB
 
Ψ
f
(R
B
,
R
E
) Theoretic
Simulated
Fig. 4. EST of the fixed-rate transmission scheme, Ψf (RB , RE), versus
RB and RE for NE = 3, γB = 15 dB, and γE = 5 dB.
B. Numerical Results
In this subsection, we present numerical results to examine
the impact of the number of antennas at Eve and the SNRs
of the main channel and eavesdropper’s channel, on R∗B and
R∗E . We also conduct a thorough performance comparison
between the adaptive transmission scheme and the fixed-rate
transmission scheme in terms of the EST.
In Fig. 4, we plot the EST of the fixed-rate transmission
scheme, Ψf (RB , RE), versus RB and RE . The theoretic
Ψf(RB , RE) curve is generated via (21). In this figure, we
first observe that the Monte Carlo simulation result precisely
matches the theoretic curve. Moreover, we observe that there
is indeed a unique pair of RB and RE that achieves a locally
maximum value of Ψf (RB, RE). This demonstrates that we
can determine the values of (RB , RE) that achieve a locally
maximum Ψf(RB , RE) based on our proposed framework.
In Fig. 5, we plot the wiretap code rates of the fixed-
rate transmission scheme, R∗B and R∗E , versus γE . The exact
curves of R∗B and R∗E are obtained by solving (28) and (29),
respectively. The curve of R∗B for γE → 0 is generated
by solving (36), and R∗E for γE → 0 is approximated as
zero. The curves of R∗B and R∗E for γE → ∞ are achieved
by solving (38) and (39), respectively. As we have checked,
in Fig. 5 R∗B and R∗E jointly achieve a locally maximum
Ψf(RB , RE). In this figure, we first observe that the Monte
Carlo simulated R∗B and R∗E precisely match the theoretic R∗B
and R∗E , respectively. We also observe that the exact curves
of R∗B and R∗E approach the asymptotic curves of R∗B and
R∗E , respectively, as γE → 0 and γE →∞. This observation
confirms the accuracy of our asymptotic analysis given in
Remark 3 and Remark 4. Finally, we observe that both R∗B
and R∗E increase as γE increases, but (R∗B − R∗E) decreases
as γE increases.
In Fig. 6, we plot R∗B and R∗E versus γB for different values
of NE , which have been confirmed as the values of RB and
RE that jointly achieve a locally maximum Ψf (RB, RE). In
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this figure, we first observe that both R∗B and R∗E increase as
γB increases, and (R∗B −R∗E) increases as γB increases. We
also observe that as γB → 0 both R∗B and R∗E approach zero,
which indicates that a positive EST cannot be achieved when
Bob is very far from Alice. Furthermore, we observe that R∗B
is still a function of γB as γB → ∞, but R∗E approaches a
specific constant value. Finally, we observe that both R∗B and
R∗E increase as NE increases, but (R∗B − R∗E) decreases as
NE increases.
Now, we conduct a thorough comparison between the
adaptive transmission scheme and the fixed-rate transmission
scheme. The results are presented in Fig. 7, where Ψ∗a is the
average locally maximum EST of the adaptive transmission
scheme, obtained by Ψ∗a = EγB [Ψ∗a]. We first observe that
both Ψ∗a and Ψ∗f increase as γB increases, but decrease as γE
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Ψ
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Ψ
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Ψ
∗
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Ψ∗f for the fixed-rate transmission scheme
Fig. 7. Ψ∗a of the adaptive transmission scheme and Ψ∗f of fixed-rate
transmission scheme versus γB for NE = 2.
increases. This indicates that the locations of Alice, Bob, and
Eve are of importance in wiretap channels. As expected, we
observe that the adaptive transmission scheme achieves higher
EST than the fixed-rate transmission scheme. In addition, we
observe that the EST gain of the adaptive transmission scheme
over the fixed-rate transmission scheme is negligible in the
regime of low γB (relative to γE), but significant in the regime
of high γB . Of course, the EST is enhanced at the cost of
feeding back CB to Alice and adjusting RB and RE for each
realization of the main channel.
V. DETERMINATION OF WIRETAP CODE RATES WITHIN
AN ABSOLUTE-PASSIVE EAVESDROPPING SCENARIO
In this section, we extend the determination of the wiretap
code rates for the adaptive and fixed-rate transmission schemes
into an absolute-passive eavesdropping scenario, where no
SNR information of the eavesdropper’s channel (not even
the average value) is made available to Alice. To relax the
assumption in the previous two sections that γE is known
at Alice, we propose a new threat model, referred to as the
annulus threat model. For this threat model, we derive closed-
form expressions for the average EST of the adaptive and
fixed-rate transmission schemes, based on which the wiretap
code rates can be determined.
A. Annulus Threat Model
Fig. 8 depicts a practical scenario where physical layer
security may apply. In this scenario, the Wi-Fi point (Alice)
and the legitimate user (Bob) are located inside a property
(e.g., a house), but the eavesdropper (Eve) is bounded outside
the property. In practice, Eve cannot be infinitely far from
Alice. As such, in practical wiretap channels the distance
between Alice and Eve should be larger than a specific value
and less than another specific value. This motivates us to
propose an annulus threat model. In the annulus threat model,
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Fig. 8. Illustration of a practical scenario based on which the annulus threat
model is proposed.
we assume that Eve’s location is uniformly distributed inside
an annulus bounded by two concentric circles, where ρi and
ρo are the radii of the inner circle and the outer circle,
respectively, and Alice is at the center of the two concentric
circles.
In our annulus threat model, we denote the distance between
Alice and Eve as ρ. Based on the path loss model, the average
SNR of the eavesdropper’s channel is a function of ρ, which
can be expressed as [25]
γE = c0ρ
−η, (45)
where c0 = γ0/ρ−ηr , γ0 is the reference average SNR of the
eavesdropper’s channel at the reference distance ρr, and η is
the path loss exponent. In the previous sections, the EST is
derived as a function of γE . In this section, we derive the
average secrecy throughput over γE under the annulus threat
model. To this end, we first present the probability density
function (pdf) of ρ2 in the following lemma.
Lemma 3: The square of the distance between Alice and
Eve, ρ2, follows a uniform distribution with ρ2i and ρ2o as
the lower bound and upper bound, respectively, i.e., ρ2 ∼
U(ρ2i , ρ
2
o).
Proof: See Appendix.
B. Adaptive Transmission Scheme
We note that the adaptive transmission scheme represents a
high complexity system where Bob feeds back CB to Alice,
and we only need to determine the value of RE for this scheme
since RB is set as RB = CB . We derive the average secrecy
throughput of the adaptive transmission scheme for the annulus
threat model in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The average EST of the adaptive transmission
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Fig. 9. Average EST of the adaptive transmission scheme for the annulus
threat model versus RE for NE = 2, γ0 = 30 dB, ρr = 1, and η = 3.
scheme for the annulus threat model is
Ψ˜a(RE ,ρi, ρo) = (CB−RE)
×
1−NE−1∑
j=0
2uj
j!
γ(v, uρηo)−γ(v, uρ
η
i )
(ρ2o−ρ
2
i )ηu
v
 , (46)
where u =
(
2RE − 1
)
/c0, v = j + 2/η, and γ(·, ·) is the
incomplete gamma function [31, Eq. (8.350.1)].
Proof: Under the annulus threat model, the average EST
of the adaptive transmission scheme is
Ψ˜a(RE , ρi, ρo) = Eρ[Ψa(RE)] =
∫ ρ2o
ρ2i
Ψa(RE)
ρ2o − ρ
2
i
dρ2. (47)
Substituting (10) and (45) into (47), we obtain
Ψ˜a(RE , ρi, ρo) =
∫ ρ2o
ρ2i
Ψa(RE)
ρ2o − ρ
2
i
dρ2
=
(CB−RE)
ρ2o−ρ
2
i
∫ ρ2o
ρ2i
1−e−2RE−1c0ρ−η NE−1∑
j=0
1
j!
(
2RE−1
c0ρ−η
)j dρ2
= (CB−RE)−
(CB−RE)
ρ2o − ρ
2
i
NE−1∑
j=0
1
j!
(
2RE−1
c0
)j
×
[∫ ρ2o
0
ρjηe
− 2
RE−1
c0
ρη
dρ2−
∫ ρ2i
0
ρjηe
− 2
RE−1
c0
ρη
dρ2
]
.
(48)
We solve the integrals in (48) with the aid of [31, Eq.
(3.381.8)], and obtain the desired result in (46) after some
algebraic manipulations.
The value of RE that achieves a locally maximum
Ψ˜a(RE , ρi, ρo) can be determined through
R˜†E = argmax
0<RE<CB
Ψ˜a(RE , ρi, ρo). (49)
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One exemplary numerical result is presented in Fig. 9, which
shows that there is a unique value of RE within 0 < RE < CB
achieving the locally maximum Ψ˜a(RE , ρi, ρo). Substituting
R˜†E into (46), we obtain the locally maximum value of
Ψ˜a(RE , ρi, ρo), denoted by Ψ˜∗a(ρi, ρo).
C. Fixed-Rate Transmission Scheme
We reminder the reader that the fixed-rate transmission
scheme represents a lower complexity system where Bob does
not feed back CB to Alice, and we have to jointly determine
the values of RB and RE . We derive the average EST of the
fixed-rate transmission scheme for the annulus threat model in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The average EST of the fixed-rate transmission
scheme for the annulus threat model is
Ψ˜f(RB , RE , ρi, ρo) = (RB −RE)e
− 2
RB−1
γB
×
1− NE−1∑
j=0
2wj
j!
γ(v, wρηo)−γ(v, wρ
η
i )
(ρ2o−ρ
2
i )ηw
v
 , (50)
where w =
(
2RE − 1
)
/c0.
Proof: Under the annulus threat model, the average EST
of the fixed-rate transmission scheme is
Ψ˜f(RB , RE , ρi, ρo) = Eρ[Ψf(RB , RE)]
=
∫ ρ2o
ρ2i
Ψf(RB , RE)
ρ2o − ρ
2
i
dρ2.
(51)
Substituting (21) and (45) into (51), we obtain
Ψ˜f (RB, RE , ρi, ρo) =
∫ ρ2o
ρ2i
Ψf (RB, RE)
ρ2o − ρ
2
i
dρ2
=
(RB −RE)
ρ2o−ρ
2
i
e
− 2
RB−1
γB
×
∫ ρ2o
ρ2i
1−e−2RE−1c0ρ−η NE−1∑
j=0
1
j!
(
2RE−1
c0ρ−η
)j dρ2
= (RB −RE)e
− 2
RB−1
γB
×
[
1−
1
ρ2o−ρ
2
i
NE−1∑
j=0
1
j!
(
2RE−1
c0
)j
×
(∫ ρ2o
0
ρjηe−
2
RE−1
c0
ρηdρ2−
∫ ρ2i
0
ρjηe−
2
RE−1
c0
ρηdρ2
)]
.
(52)
We solve the integrals in (52) with the aid of [31, Eq.
(3.381.8)], and obtain the result in (50) after some algebraic
manipulations.
The values of (RB , RE) that achieve a locally maximum
Ψ˜f(RB , RE , ρi, ρo) can be determined through
(RB, RE)
∗
ρ = argmax
0<RB ,0<RE<RB
Ψ˜f(RB , RE , ρi, ρo). (53)
The values of RB and RE in (RB , RE)∗ρ are denoted as R˜∗B
and R˜∗E , respectively. Our numerical results show that there
is a unique pair of R˜∗B and R˜∗E that achieves a locally max-
imum Ψ˜f (RB, RE , ρi, ρo) over all the anticipated operating
conditions. One exemplary numerical result is presented in
Fig. 10. Substituting R˜∗B and R˜∗E into (50), we obtain the
locally maximum value of Ψ˜f(RB , RE , ρi, ρo), denoted by
Ψ˜∗f(ρi, ρo).
D. Numerical Results
In this subsection, we present numerical results to examine
the impact of ρi and ρo on the determined wiretap code rates
and the locally maximum average EST of the adaptive and
fixed-rate transmission schemes.
In Fig. 11, we plot the redundancy rate, R˜†E , and the
locally maximum average EST, Ψ˜∗a(ρi, ρo), of the adaptive
transmission scheme versus ρi and ρo. In this figure, we first
observe that R˜†E decreases as ρi increases, which reveals that
the redundancy rate used to confuse Eve can be reduced
by increasing the inner boundary. We also observe that R˜†E
decreases as ρo increases. This can be explained by the fact
that a larger outer boundary ρo means Eve is statistically
further from Alice. Moreover, we observe Ψ˜∗a(ρi, ρo) increases
as ρi increases, which indicates that the further the inner
boundary is from Alice, the better secrecy performance the
adaptive transmission scheme achieves. As such, a higher
average EST can be achieved through enlarging the inner
boundary. We further observe that Ψ˜∗a(ρi, ρo) increases as ρo
increases. This can be explained by the fact that Ψ˜∗a(ρi, ρo) is
averaged over γE in the annulus threat model, and a larger ρo
means that Eve is further from Alice on average since in the
annulus threat model Eve’s location is uniformly distributed
in the annulus.
In Fig. 12, we plot the wiretap code rates, R˜∗B and R˜∗E , and
the locally maximum average EST, Ψ˜∗f (ρi, ρo), of the fixed-
rate transmission scheme versus ρi and ρo. In this figure, we
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first observe that both R˜∗B and R˜∗E decrease as ρi increases,
and R˜∗E is more sensitive to ρi than R˜∗B , which results in
Ψ˜∗f (ρi, ρo) increasing as ρi increases. The above observation
indicates that the further the inner boundary is from Alice, the
better secrecy performance the fixed-rate transmission scheme
achieves. We also observe that both R˜∗B and R˜∗E increase as
ρo increases, and R˜∗E is more sensitive to ρo than R˜∗B , which
results in Ψ˜∗f (ρi, ρo) increasing as ρo increases. This is can be
explained by the fact that Ψ˜∗f(ρi, ρo) is averaged over γE , and
a larger ρo means that Eve is statistically further from Alice.
We note that the issue of the unknown average SNR of
the eavesdropper’s channel γE can be investigated via the
consideration of a general average SNR model. In such an
average SNR model, a specific distribution (e.g., a uniform
distribution or a Gaussian distribution) can be assigned to γE
and then thorough analysis of the average effective secrecy
throughput of the adaptive and fixed-rate transmission schemes
can be conducted. We find that the specific distribution of
γE has to be carefully selected based on practical application
scenarios and corresponding system parameters. This is due
to the fact that the distribution of γE may depend on some
specific system parameters. For example, the distribution type
of γE is dependent on the path loss exponent η within our
annulus threat model.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new framework to determine
the wiretap code rates for the SISOME wiretap channel. We
considered several scenarios including the case of the absolute-
passive eavesdropping scenario in which even the average SNR
of the eavesdropper’s channel is unknown at the transmitter.
The framework is based on a new performance metric, the
EST, which captures explicitly the reliability constraint and
secrecy constraint of wiretap channels. The framework does
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NE = 2, γB = 20 dB, γ0 = 30 dB, ρr = 1, and η = 3.
not require a determination of the secrecy outage probability
a priori or subjectively, and therefore is very pragmatic.
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APPENDIX: PROOF OF LEMMA 3
In the Cartesian coordinate system, we denote the location
of Eve by (u, v). In the annulus threat model, the joint pdf of
u and v is
fU,V (u, v) =
{ 1
pi(ρ2o−ρ
2
i )
, ρ2i ≤ u
2 + v2 ≤ ρ2o,
0 , otherwise.
(54)
In the polar coordinate system, we denote the location of Eve
by (ρ, θ). As such, we obtain u = ρ cos θ and v = ρ sin θ. The
Jacobian matrix for this coordinate change is given by
J(ρ, θ) =
∂(u, v)
∂(ρ, θ)
=
[
cos θ −ρ sin θ
sin θ ρ cos θ
]
. (55)
Using (55), the determinant of J(ρ, θ) is calculated as
|J(ρ, θ)| = ρ. Based on Jacobian techniques for the trans-
formation of random variables [32], the joint pdf of ρ and θ
is given by
fP,Θ(ρ, θ) = fU,V (u, v)|J(ρ, θ)|
=
{ ρ
pi(ρ2o−ρ
2
i )
, 0≤θ≤2pi, ρi≤ρ≤ρo,
0 , otherwise.
(56)
Using (56), the marginal pdf of ρ is derived as
fP(ρ) =
∫ 2pi
0
fP,Θ(ρ, θ)dθ =
{
2ρ
ρ2o−ρ
2
i
, ρi≤ρ≤ρo,
0 , otherwise.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. X, NO. X, MONTH, YEAR. 12
In order to derive the pdf of ρ2, we denote λ = ρ2. As per
the rules on the transformation of random variables, the pdf
of ρ2 is given by
fP2(ρ
2) =
∣∣∣∣dρdλ
∣∣∣∣ fP(ρ) = { 1ρ2o−ρ2i , ρ2i ≤ρ2≤ρ2o,0 , otherwise. (57)
This completes the proof.
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